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ABSTRACT
Due to its hereditary nature, genomic data is not only linked to its
owner but to that of close relatives as well. As a result, its sensi-
tivity does not really degrade over time; in fact, the relevance of a
genomic sequence is likely to be longer than the security provided
by encryption. This prompts the need for specialized techniques
providing long-term security for genomic data, yet the only avail-
able tool for this purpose is GenoGuard [17]. By relying on Honey
Encryption, GenoGuard is secure against an adversary that can
brute force all possible keys; i.e., whenever an attacker tries to de-
crypt using an incorrect password, she will obtain an incorrect but
plausible looking decoy sequence.
In this paper, we set to analyze the real-world security guaran-
tees provided by GenoGuard; specifically, assess how much more
information does access to a ciphertext encrypted using GenoGuard
yield, compared to one that was not. Overall, we find that, if the
adversary has access to side information in the form of partial in-
formation from the target sequence, the use of GenoGuard does
appreciably increase her power in determining the rest of the se-
quence. We show that, in the case of a sequence encrypted using
an easily guessable (low-entropy) password, the adversary is able
to rule out most decoy sequences, and obtain the target sequence
with just 2.5% of it available as side information. In the case of a
harder-to-guess (high-entropy) password, we show that the adver-
sary still obtains, on average, better accuracy in guessing the rest of
the target sequences than using state-of-the-art genomic sequence
inference methods, obtaining up to 15% improvement in accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the cost of sequencing the human
genome – i.e., determining a person’s complete DNA sequence
– has plummeted from millions to thousands of dollars, and con-
tinues to drop [27]. As a result, sequencing has not only become
routine in biology and biomedics research, but is also increasingly
used in clinical contexts, with treatments tailored to the patient’s
genetic makeup [1]. At the same time, the “direct-to-consumer” ge-
netic testing market is booming [43] with companies like 23andMe
and AncestryDNA attracting millions of customers, and provid-
ing them with easy access to reports on their ancestry or genetic
predisposition to health-related conditions. Progress and invest-
ments in genomics have also enabled public initiatives to gather
genomic data for research purposes. For instance, in 2015, the US
launched the “All of Us” program [29], which aims to sequence one
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million people, while, in the UK, Genomics England is sequencing
the genomes of 100,000 patients with rare diseases or cancer [14].
Alas, as more and more genomic data is generated, collected, and
shared, serious privacy, security, and ethical concerns also become
increasingly relevant. The genome contains very sensitive infor-
mation related to, e.g., ethnic heritage, disease predispositions, and
other phenotypic traits [2]. Furthermore, even though most pub-
lished genomes have been anonymized, previous work has shown
that anonymization does not provide an effective safeguard for
genomic data [15]. While some individuals choose to donate their
genome to science, or even publicly share it [32], others might be
concerned about their privacy, or fear discrimination by employers,
government agencies, insurance providers, etc. [6].
Worse yet, consequences of genomic data disclosure are not lim-
ited in time or to the data owner: due to its hereditary nature, access
to one’s sequenced genome inherently implies access to many fea-
tures that are relevant to their progeny and their close relatives. A
case in point is the story of Henrietta Lacks, a patient who died of
cancer in 1951. Some of her cancerous cells revealed to be useful for
research because of their ability to keep on dividing. Unbeknownst
to her family, the cells became the most commonly used “immortal
cell line,” and their genome was eventually sequenced and pub-
lished [23]. This prompted serious privacy concerns among her
family members, even 60 years later [7].
Motivated by these challenges, the research community has
produced a large body of work aiming to protect genomic pri-
vacy and enable privacy-preserving sharing and testing of human
genomes [26]. Available solutions mostly rely on cryptographic
tools, including encryption as well as Secure Computation, Homo-
morphic Encryption, Oblivious RAM, etc. [4]. However, modern
encryption algorithms provide security guarantees only against
computationally bounded adversary; essentially, their security is
assumed to last for 30 to 50 years [37]. While this timeframe is
acceptable for most uses of encryption, it is not for genomic data.
To address the problem of “long-term security,” Huang et al. [17]
introduce GenoGuard, a tool based on Honey Encryption (HE) [20]
to provide confidentiality of genomic data even in the presence
of an adversary who can brute force all possible encryption keys.
GenoGuard uses a distribution transforming encoder (DTE) to-
gether with symmetric (password-based) encryption. In essence,
whenever an attacker would try to decrypt a GenoGuard cipher-
text using a wrong password, the decryption will give a wrong but
plausible looking plaintext, which we denote as a honey sequence.
HE schemes based on DTE-then-encrypt constructions (as is
the case for GenoGuard) only provide security in the message
recovery context. That is, having access to the ciphertext only gives
an unbounded adversary a negligible advantage in guessing the
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correct plaintext. However, as first discussed by Jaeger et al. [19],
ciphertexts obtained from DTE-then-encrypt HE might still leak a
significant amount of information about the plaintexts.
Technical Roadmap. We evaluate GenoGuard security by ana-
lyzing ciphertexts obtained using easily guessable (low-entropy)
passwords as well as hard (high-entropy) ones. In other words, in
both cases, we decrypt a GenoGuard ciphertext using a corpus of
passwords and analyze the resulting decryptions (honey sequences).
In the low-entropy setting, we consider an adversary who aims to
identify the correct sequence among a pool of honey sequences,
whereas, in the high-entropy case, one that uses the GenoGuard
ciphertext in order to obtain more information about the target
sequence as opposed to inference methods for genomic data.
In our experimental evaluation, we show that, under a low-
entropy password setting, an adversary who has access to side
information about the target sequence can quickly eliminate the
decoy sequences in order to have an increased advantage of guess-
ing the correct sequence. This draws attention to the fact that if the
attacker obtains a list of known passwords for a user (as passwords
are often compromised and/or re-used), together with some side
information about the user’s sequence, she can have a significant
advantage in guessing the correct sequence.
In the high-entropy setting, not only we observe that access to
the GenoGuard ciphertext improves an adversary’s accuracy in
guessing SNVs from a target sequence when 10% or less of the
target sequence is available to her as side information, but also
draws attention to the fact that with enough side information, the
adversary can predict a significant part of the target genome just
by using state of the art inference methods for genomic sequences.
Contributions. In summary, our paper makes two main contri-
butions. First, under a low-entropy password setting, we formally
show that, if the adversary obtains side information about the target
sequence, there is a significant lower bound in her advantage. This
highlights that the system offers low security when the adversary
has access to side information, as supported by empirical evidence.
Second, in the high-entropy password setting, we quantify the pri-
vacy loss for a user as a result of using GenoGuard, compared to
the best inference methods for genomic data; once again, showing
that that it is non-negligible.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section reviews notions used throughout the paper,
then, in Section 3, we introduce GenoGuard. Section 4 presents our
evaluation methodology for low and high-entropy settings, while
Section 5 reports our experimental results. Finally, after reviewing
related work in Section 6, the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section provides some relevant background information used
throughout the paper.
2.1 Genomics Primer
Genome. In the nucleus of an organism’s cell, double stranded de-
oxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules are packaged into thread-like
structures called chromosomes. DNA molecules consist of two long
and complementary polymer chains of four units called nucleotides,
described with the letters A, C, G, and T. All chromosomes together
make up the genome, which represents the entirety of the organ-
ism’s hereditary information; in humans, the genome includes 3.2
billion nucleotides. A gene is a particular region of the genome
that contain the information to produce functional molecules, in
particular proteins. For instance, the BRCA2 [44] is a human tumor
suppressor gene (it encodes a protein responsible for repairing the
DNA), and a mutation in that gene increases significantly the risk
for breast cancer [13]. Alleles are the different versions of genes, as
organisms inherit two alleles for each gene, one from each parent.
The set of genes is also called the genotype. Finally, the haplotype is
a group of alleles in an organisms that are inherited together from
a single parent [10].
SNPs and SNVs. Humans share about 99.5% of the genome, while
the rest differs due to genetic variations. The most common type of
variants are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) [34], which
occur at a single position and in at least 1% of the population. More
generally, variants at specific positions of a genome are referred
to as Single-Nucleotide Variants (SNVs); they may be due to SNPs,
to rare variants in the population, or to new mutations. Typically,
SNPs and SNVs are encodedwith a value in {0, 1, 2}, with 0 denoting
the most common variant (allele) in the population, and 1 and 2
denoting alternative alleles.
Allele Frequency (AF). The frequency of an allele at a certain
position in a given population is known as Allele Frequency (AF).
More specifically, it is the ratio of the number of times the allele
appears in the population over the total number of copies of the
gene. In a nutshell, it shows the genetic diversity of a species’
population.
Linkage Disequilibrium (LD). LD refers to the non-random asso-
ciation of alleles at two or more positions in the general population,
defined as the difference between the frequency of a particular
combination of alleles at different positions and the one expected
by random association.
Recombination Rate (RR). The process of determining the fre-
quency with which characteristics are inherited together is known
as recombination. This is due to two chromosomes of similar compo-
sition coming together and performing a molecular crossover, thus,
exchanging the genetic content. Because recombination can occur
with small probability at any location along the chromosome, the
frequency of recombination between two locations depends on the
distance separating them. Therefore, for genes sufficiently distant
on the same chromosome, the amount of crossover is high enough
to destroy the correlation between alleles [24]. The recombination
rate (RR), as defined in [33], is the probability that a transmitted
haplotype constitutes a new combination of alleles different from
that of either parental haplotype. An example of how a haplotype
is created by copying parts from the other haplotypes is illustrated
in Figure 1.
2.2 Markov Chains
A Markov chain is a probabilistic model encoding a sequence of
possible events: the probability of each one of them depends only
on the state attained in the previous event [30].
In the context of genomes, a Markov chain can represent a se-
ries of SNVs ordered by their positions. In particular, a k-th order
Figure 1: An example of a haplotype,h4, built as an imperfect
mosaic from h1,h2,h3. h4 is created by (imperfectly) “copy-
ing” parts from h1,h2, and h3. Each column of circles repre-
sents a SNP locus, with the black and white circles denoting
the two alleles – major and minor. (Adapted from [24]).
Markov chain, on genome sequences, can be used to encode a set
of SNVs, where the value of each SNVi depends on the values of
the k preceding ones:
Pr(SNVi ) = Pr(SNVi |SNVi−1, . . . , SNVi−k ) (1)
2.3 SNV Correlation Modeling
In order to model correlations between SNVs, and perform sequence
inference (i.e. predicting the values of SNVs from a sequence), one
can use a few different approaches (for more details on various
SNV correlations, please refer to [35]). We choose three models; see
next.
Most likely genotype. First, we use a model based on the 1st order
Markov chain model from AF and LD. Given allele frequencies (AF)
and linkage disequilibrium (LD), we predict each SNV using the
highest conditional probability of the SNV occurring. For each SNV,
the joint probability matrix is computed taking into consideration
the LD with previous one and the AF. If a SNV is not in LD with
the previous one, the probability is computed using only the allele
frequency. When this model is used for inference, the highest value
from the joint probability matrix or the highest probability given
by the AF is chosen to predict the specific SNV.
Sampled genotype. The second model is built from the 1st order
Markov chain model from AF and LD. For this model, the condi-
tional probabilities are computed in a similar way as in the most
likely genotype model. The main difference is in the choice of the
value of the SNV, given the three computed probabilities for ma-
jor homozygous Pr0, heterozygous Pr1, and minor homozygous
allele Pr2. A seed s is chosen uniformly at random from the interval
[0, 1). If s < Pr0, then choose the SNV to be major homozygous;
if Pr0 ≤ s < Pr1 + Pr0, then the SNV is heterozygous; and minor
homozygous otherwise.
RR Model. This is a high-order correlation model that relates LD
patterns to the underlying recombination rate [25]. Given a set
of n sampled haplotypes, {h1,h2, ...,hn }, the model relates their
distribution to the underlying recombination rate. Given the recom-
bination parameter, ρ, we have:
Pr(h1, ...,hn |ρ) =
= Pr(h1 |ρ) · Pr(h2 |h1; ρ) · . . . · Pr(hn |h1, . . . ,hn−1; ρ) (2)
We use this model to determine the value of a SNP at a given
position. At each SNP, hk is a possibly imperfect copy of one of
h1, ...,hk−1. Let Hi denote which haplotype is copied at a position
i . For instance, in the example presented in Figure 1, for h4, we
have (H1,H2,H3,H4) = (3, 2, 2, 1). For a generic hk , each Hi can
be modeled as a Markov chain on {1, . . . ,k − 1}. Assuming that
one part of hk comes from hi , the next adjacent part can be copied
from any of the k − 1 haplotypes, and the probability depends
on the recombination rates between these two parts. Overall, the
probability of a particular haploid genotype hk can be computed
as the sum over all possible event sequences of recombination and
mutation that could lead to hk . Let hi, j+1 denote the allele found at
position j+1 in haplotype i , andhi,≤j denote the values of the first j
positions of haplotype i (i.e. the prefix sequence of hi, j+1). Then, we
can compute the conditional probability of an allele hk, j+1, given
all preceding alleles as:
Pr(hk, j+1 |hk, j , . . .hk,1) =
Pr(hk,≤j+1)
Pr(hk,≤j)
(3)
2.4 Honey Encryption
Honey Encryption (HE) [20] is a cryptographic primitive used to
provide confidentiality guarantees in the presence of possible brute-
force attacks. It is a variant of Password-based Encryption (PBE),
in that it also uses an arbitrary string (password) to perform ran-
domized encryption of a plaintext. Its main property is that all
decryptions of a ciphertext will yield a plausible-looking plaintext,
which is thus indistinguishable from the correct one.
The main building block of HE is the Distribution-Transforming
Encoder (DTE). A DTE is a randomized encoding scheme (encode,
decode) tailored on the target distribution. The encode algorithm
takes as input a messageM from the message spaceM, and outputs
a value S in a set S, i.e., the seed space. Whereas, decode takes
a seed S ∈ S and outputs a message M ∈ M. A DTE scheme is
correct if, for any M ∈ M, Pr[decode(encode(M))= M] = 1. The
DTE-then-encrypt scheme presented in [20] applies encode to a
message, and then performs encryption using a secure symmetric
encryption scheme (e.g., AES). Similarly, to decrypt a ciphertext,
one first decrypts using the underlying cipher (e.g., AES), and then
applies the decode algorithm.
Terminology. In the rest of the paper, to denote sequences de-
crypted from GenoGuard, we use the term honey sequences.
3 GENOGUARD
In this section, we review GenoGuard [17], along with a security
analysis of the framework.
3.1 Construction
GenoGuard is a framework providing long-term confidentiality for
genomic data based on Honey Encryption [20]. More specifically, it
allows to encode genomic data, encrypt it using a secret password,
and store in a database, in such a way that its confidentiality is
preserved even against an attacker that can brute-force all possible
passwords. In GenoGuard, genomes are represented as a sequence
of single-nucleotide variants (SNVs), i.e., values in {0, 1, 2}.
Figure 2: Toy example describing the encoding process for a sequence (1, 0, 2). The green dashed line represents the correct
encoding of the sequence. When the final leaf (interval [0.224, 0.24]) is reached, a seed is picked at random from this range.
Encoding. The construction uses a DTE scheme optimized for
genome sequences. It assigns subspaces of seed space S to the
prefixes of a sequence M , i.e., all the subsequences in the set
{M1,i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where n is the length of the sequence. For exam-
ple, the prefixes of the sequence 01102 are {0, 01, 011, 0110, 01102}.
The seed space S is the interval [0, 1), with each seed being a real
number in this interval.
LetM be the set of all possible sequences (the plaintext space).
To calculate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each
sequence, a total order O is assigned to all sequences in M. For
any two different sequencesM andM ′, we assume that they start
to differ at SNVi and SNV′i . If the value of SNVi is smaller than
that of SNV’i , then, O(M) < O(M ′), and O(M) > O(M ′) otherwise.
The CDF of a sequenceM is then calculated as:
CDF (M) = ∑M ′∈M,O(M ′)≤O(M ) PrSNV (M ′)
where PrSNV (M ′) is the probability of the sequenceM ′.
The encoding of a sequence can be performed using a perfect
ternary tree, as depicted in Figure 2. (Note that the plot was gener-
ated using code obtained from GenoGuard’s Github page.1) Each
node in the tree represents a prefix of a sequence, and each leaf
a complete sequence. Nodes have an interval [Lji ,U
j
i ), where i is
the depth of the node in the tree and j its order at a given depth i .
The first node has the interval [L00,U 00 ) = [0, 1). Depending on the
value of the SNV at position i+1, the encoding proceeds from the
node that representsM1,i with order j at depth i to depth i + 1 as
follows:
• If SNVi+1 = 0, go to the left branch and attach an interval
[L3ji+1,U
3j
i+1) = [L
j
i ,L
j
i + (U
j
i − L
j
i ) × Pr(SNVi+1 = 0|M1,i ))• If SNVi+1 = 1, go to the middle branch and attach an interval
[L3j+1i+1 ,U
3j+1
i+1 ) = [L
j
i + (U
j
i −L
j
i )×Pr(SNVi+1 = 0|M1,i ),L
j
i +
(U ji − L
j
i ) × (Pr(SNVi+1 = 0|M1,i + Pr(SNVi+1 = 1|M1,i )))
1https://github.com/acs6610987/GenoGuard
• If SNVi+1 = 2, go to the right branch and attach an interval
[L3j+2i+1 ,U
3j+2
i+1 ) = [L
j
i + (U
j
i − L
j
i ) × (Pr(SNVi+1 = 0|M1,i +
Pr(SNVi+1 = 1|M1,i )),U ji ).
In order to compute the conditional probabilities, Huang et al. [17]
consider several models and compare their goodness of fit for real-
world genome datasets. Specifically, they experiment with Linkage
Disequilibrium (LD), Allele Frequencies (AF), building k-th order
Markov chains on the dataset and recombination rates (RR), and
find the latter to perform best.
Finally, when a leaf is reached, a seed is picked uniformly from
this range as the encoding of the corresponding sequence, and then
fed into a Password-based Encryption (PBE) scheme to perform
encryption, using a password chosen by the user.
Decoding. To decode an encoded-then-encrypted sequence, the
ciphertext is first decrypted (as per the PBE scheme) using the
user-chosen password; this recovers the seed. Then, the decoding
process proceeds similar to the encoding one. That is, given the
seed S ∈ [0, 1), at each step, the algorithm computes three intervals
for the three branches, chooses the interval in which the seed S
falls, and moves down the tree. Once a leaf node is reached, the
path from the root to the leaf is outputted as the decoded sequence.
Finite Precision.Note that the Honey Encryption encodingmodel,
as described in Section 3.1, requires the seed space S to be a real
number domain with infinite precision. In the case of DNA se-
quences, this would yield a very long floating-point representation,
and thus a high storage overhead. Therefore, GenoGuard uses a
modification of the DTE scheme for finite precision. Specifically,
for a sequence of length n, where each SNV takes three possible
values, at least n · log2 3 bits are needed for storing the sequence.
Hence, a storage overhead parameter h > log2 3 is selected, and
each sequence is encoded over h · n bits. The algorithm works as
before, by selecting intervals according to the values of the respec-
tive SNVs based on conditional probabilities. The root interval is
[0, 2hn−1]. At each branch at depth i , the algorithm will allocate a
seed space of size 3n−i−1, and each following step will segment an
input interval into three parts of equal size. Hence, any subinterval
of the j-th node at depth i will contain 3n−i−1 integers.
3.2 Security
Huang et al. [17] evaluate the security of GenoGuard vis-à-vis the
probability of an unbounded adversary recovering the encrypted
sequence. That is, given the encryption of a message, what is the
probability of the adversary recovering the correct message, even if
she can brute-force all possible encryption keys for the underlying
PBE scheme?
Upper Bound.More formally, they prove an upper bound to the
probability an adversary recovers the correct message to be:
Prpm,pk ≤ w(1 + δ ) +
3n + 1/w
2(h−log2 3)n
(4)
where pm is the original sequence distribution with maximum
sequence probability γ , pk is a key (password) distribution with
maximum weightw (i.e., the most probable password has probabil-
ity w), n is the length of the sequence, h the overhead parameter,
and δ a parameter depending onw and γ .
Let ∆ denote the fraction 3
n+1/w
2(h−log2 3)n in Equation 4. Note that ∆ is
a security loss term, since the upper bound on plaintext recovery
probability should bew , as an adversary who trivially decrypts the
ciphertext with the most probable key and outputs the result can
recover the original message with probability w . ∆ is essentially
the security lost due to DTE imperfectness when moving to finite
precision, i.e., given by the difference between the original message
distribution and the DTE distribution. As shown in [17], for n =
20,000, h = 4, w = 1100 , and γ = 2.89 × 10−44, ∆ is approximately
2−16600.
Empirical Evaluation. Huang et al. [17] also present an empirical
security analysis based on two experiments. In both, the chromo-
some 22 of a victim is encrypted using a password pool consisting
of numbers from 1 to 1000, with “539” assumed to be the correct one.
Then, in order to rule out wrong passwords, the interval size of each
of the decrypted sequences is computed. In the first experiment, a
genome is encoded by assuming a uniform distribution (i.e., each
branch has weight 1/3 at all depths), and a PBE scheme is used to
encrypt the seed. In the second experiment, GenoGuard is used to
encrypt the victim’s sequence. Hence, the size of the interval of
a leaf in the ternary tree is proportional to the probability of the
corresponding sequence. The results of their experiments, reported
in Figure 10 in [17], show that a simple classifier can distinguish
the correct sequence in the first experiment, while, in the second
one, it is “buried” among all the decrypted sequences.
4 EVALUATION METHODS
We now describe our evaluation methods, for both low and high-
entropy password settings. Before doing so, we introduce the nota-
tion used in the rest of the paper in Table 1.
4.1 Low-Entropy vs High-Entropy Password
We use different approaches for evaluating GenoGuard under two
different password types, namely low-entropy and high-entropy
passwords. In other words, we encrypt a sequence with GenoGuard
Symbol Meaning
MR Message recovery
SI Side information
HEnc Honey Encryption
HDec Honey Decryption
K Key space
M Message space
pk Key distribution
pm Message distribution
A Adversary
ASI Adversary with access to side information
Table 1: Notation.
using either an easy to guess, low-entropy password (≈7 bits), or
using a harder password with a higher entropy (≈72 bits).
The difference in the evaluation of the two approaches is given
by the adversary’s goal. Specifically, in the low-entropy password
case, the adversary attempts to use the side information in order to
distinguish the original encrypted sequence among a pool of honey
sequences. By contrast, in the high-entropy setting, the adversary
uses both the honey sequences and the side information in order
to predict the value of each SNV at each position in the target
sequence.
4.2 Threat Model
We use the same system and threat model presented in the
GenoGuard paper [17], i.e., we assume a genomic sequence of a
user is to be stored, encrypted, at a third-party database, e.g., a
biobank. We consider an adversary that has access to the encrypted
data (for instance, she breaks into the biobank and gets access to
the encrypted database, or the biobank itself is adversarial) and has
access to public knowledge as well as to some side information (as
discussed below).
Low-Entropy Password. The main adversarial goal in this case is
to identify the target sequence among a pool of honey sequences,
using the side information available, i.e. “message recovery” with
side information (MR-SI).
High-Entropy Password. The main adversarial goal is to obtain
as much information as possible about the sequence that was en-
crypted. Note that this adversarial goal is different from “message re-
covery,” according to which Huang et al. [17] evaluate GenoGuard’s
security (cf. Section 3.2). The main intuition is that, as also hy-
pothesized by [19], using Honey Encryption might actually leak
non-negligible information about the sequences encrypted using
GenoGuard, even if the adversary cannot correctly recover the full
plaintext with non-negligible probability.
4.3 Adversary’s Side Information
As mentioned above, the adversary has access to the victim’s en-
crypted sequence as well as to public information such as, Linkage
Disequilibrium, Allele Frequencies, Recombination Rate (see Sec-
tion 2.1). In addition, we assume that the adversary may have some
side information about the victim.
When referring to side information, note that we do not consider
knowledge of common traits from phenotype-genotype associa-
tions, e.g., gender, ancestry, or other information about the victim
that could be obtained, e.g., from social media. In fact, this is cov-
ered by GenoGuard’s guidelines, which state that the user should
include as much side information about their genome as possible
when performing the encoding. Whereas, even though assuming
the user can knowingly enumerate all possible side information is
quite a strong assumption, we actually consider the case where the
victim undertakes some specific tests, and the adversary learns addi-
tional information about the victim from the outcome of those tests.
Additionally, the victim might choose to re-encrypt their genome
after obtaining the test results in order to incorporate them in the
encoding, and the adversary could use the new ciphertext to extract
information about the old ciphertext.
In the high-entropy password setting, we also evaluate the case
where an adversary has no side information about the target se-
quence, in order to quantify the information leakage that might
occur from using GenoGuard against baseline inference methods
for genomic sequences. Overall, we consider different types of side
information available to the adversary:
(1) No Side Information: The adversary has access only to the
encrypted sequence. (NB: this is only evaluated for the high-
entropy password setting)
(2) Sparse SNVs: The adversary has access to SNV values sparsely
distributed in the target sequence.
(3) Consecutive SNVs: The adversary has access to values from a
cluster of consecutive SNVs in the target sequence.
4.4 Low-Entropy Password
We now formally provide a lower bound for the adversary’s advan-
tage in the case where she obtains side information about the target
sequence and encryption is done using a low-entropy password.
We present a lower bound on the adversary’s advantage when
she has access to side information about the encrypted sequence
and can exhaustively search the message space. We prove the
bound formally, building on [19], which shows the impossibil-
ity of known-message attack (KMA) security with low-entropy
passwords. However, instead of the adversary having access to
message-ciphertext pairs, we assume that the adversary has ac-
cess to (position, value) pairs from the encrypted sequence. The
game defining message recovery security with side information is
denoted asMR-SIAHE,pm,pk and illustrated in Figure 3.
Given a ciphertext C∗, an adversary ASI , with access to side
information, is allowed to guess the message by brute force. The
adversary ASI wins the game if her output message is the same as
the original message.
Our intuition is that the advantage of the adversary ASI (Fig-
ure 4), for a number q (q ≤ 2n, where n = [log2 |K |]) of positions
and values, from the original sequence, is equal to the probabil-
ity that a randomly chosen key that decrypts correctly all values
at the given positions, will also decrypt the rest of the sequence,
i.e., AdvMR−SIHE,pm,pk (n) = Pr[MR − SI
A
HE,pm,pk
]. We denote by Kq the
number of keys consistent with the positions and values used as
side information.
Hence, we use Lemma 4.2 from [19], as follows:
MR-SIAHE,pm,pk :
 K∗ ←pk K
 M∗ ←pm M
 C∗ ←$HEnc(K∗,M∗)
 M←$ASI (C∗)
 IfM = M∗: Return 1
Else: Return 0
Figure 3: Definition of Message Recovery Security with Side
Information (MR-SI).
Adversary ASI (C∗):
 Let q be the number of known SNVs
 Let SI be the set of q pairs (posi ,vali ) from M∗
 Kq ← ∅
 For K ∈ K :
If(∀i HDec(K,C∗)[posi ] = vali ):
Kq ← Kq ∪ {K}
 K ←$Kq
 Return HDec(K ,C∗)
Figure 4: Adversary strategy for MR-SI, having access to q
pairs of (position, value) from the original message.
Game 1:
 K∗ ←pk K
 M∗ ←pm M
 C∗ ←$HEnc(K∗,M∗)
 Let q be the number of known SNVs
 Let SI be the set of q pairs (posi ,vali ) from M∗
 Kq ← ∅
 For K ∈ K :
If(∀i HDec(K,C∗)[posi ] = vali ):
Kq ← Kq ∪ {K}
 K ←$Kq
 M← HDec(K ,C∗)
 IfM = M∗: Return 1
Else: Return 0
Figure 5: Game 1, used in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma 4.1. If s0, s1, ..., sn are positive integer-valued random
variables such that s0 ≤ 2n and sq+1 ≤ sq , for q ∈ Zn , then
maxq∈Zn E
[
sq+1/sq
] ≥ 12n .
Proof. See [19].
Using Lemma 4.1, we can compute the adversary’s advantage as
follows:
Theorem 4.2. Let HE be an encryption scheme and n = [log2 |K |].
Then, for any pm ,pk , the adversary ASI who obtains at most n − 1
positions and values from the original sequence will have advantage:
AdvMR−SIHE,pm,pk (A
SI ) ≥ 12n2
Game 2:
 K∗ ←pk K
 M∗ ←pm M
 C∗ ←$HEnc(K∗,M∗)
 Let q be the number of known SNVs
 Let SI be the set of q pairs (posi ,vali ) from M∗
 K0 ← K ;K1,K2, ...Kq+1 ← ∅
 For (posi ,vali ) ∈ SI :
For K ∈ Ki−1:
If(HDec(K,C∗)[posi ] = vali ):
Ki ← Ki ∪ {K}
 For K ∈ Kq :
If HDec(K ,C∗) = M∗
Kq+1 ← Kq ∪ {K}
 K ←$Kq
 If K ∈ Kq+1: Return 1
Else: Return 0
Figure 6: Game 2, a transformed version of Game 1.
Proof. The advantage AdvMR−SIHE,pm,pk (A
SI ), is equal to
Pr[Game 1 Retuns 1] where Game 1 is defined in Figure 5. This
is due to the fact that Game 1 is MR-SIAHE,pm,pk together with
Adversary ASI (C∗). By applying a few transformations to Game 1
and changing the final check, i.e. instead of checking if M = M∗
before returning 0 or 1, it checks if the key K is in the subset
that decrypts C∗ to M∗ we obtain an equivalent game, Game 2
(Figure 6). Thus, Pr[Game 1 Returns 1] = Pr[Game 2 Returns 1].
Since Kq+1 ⊆ Kq , for fixed q, the probability that Game 2
will return 1 is E
[ |Kq+1 |
|Kq |
]
. So we have Pr[Game 2 Returns 1] =∑n
q=0
1
n E
[ |Kq+1 |
|Kq |
]
.
We then define Experiment 1 (Figure 7), which shows that the dis-
tribution of Kq+1 and Kq for q ∈ Zn is the same as the distribution
in Game 1. Let sq denote |Kq | and ϵ = maxq∈Zn E
[
sq+1
sq
]
, where
the expectation is taken in Experiment 1. Since all Kq contain at
least the key K∗, they all are positive. Thus, by applying Lemma 4.1
we have ϵ ≥ 12n . Then:
AdvMR−SIHE,pm,pk (A
SI ) = Pr[Game 2 Returns 1]
=
∑n
q=0
1
n E
[ |Kq+1 |
|Kq |
]
≥ 1n · ϵ ≥ 12n2
This shows that the security of the systems is weak even with a
small number of pairs (position, value) from the target sequence
available to the attacker, as opposed to having multiple known
ciphertext-plaintext pairs.
4.5 High-Entropy Password
We now give an overview of our inference strategy using the
GenoGuard ciphertext and discuss the baseline inference meth-
ods we evaluate our strategy against.
4.5.1 Baseline Inferences. We compare the performance of our
inference strategy to baselines for genomic sequence inference. For
these baselines, we assume that the adversary has access only to
Experiment 1:
 K0 ← K ;K1,K2, ...Kn ← ∅
 K∗ ←pk K
 M∗ ←pm M
 C∗ ←$HEnc(K∗,M∗)
 Let n be the number of known SNVs
 Let SI be the set of n pairs (posi ,vali ) from M∗
 For (posi ,vali ) ∈ SI :
For K ∈ Ki−1:
If(HDec(K,C∗)[posi ] = vali ):
Ki ← Ki ∪ {K}
Figure 7: Experiment 1, used in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
side information, as discussed in Section 4.3, but not the ciphertext
resulting from GenoGuard’s encode-then-encrypt method.
As done by Samani et al. [35], we set to infer the value of an un-
known SNVi , given a probabilistic modeling of genome sequences.
More specifically, we use the following models for SNV correlation:
• B1: 1st order Markov chain model from AF and LD: most
likely genotype.
• B2: 1st order Markov chain model from AF and LD: sampled
genotype.
• B3: RR Model.
4.5.2 GenoGuard Inference Methods. Our method is based on ex-
ploiting the similarities between the honey sequences in order to
obtain information about the target sequence. More specifically, we
use two strategies:
(1) G1. Side information-weighted SNVs: We assign a weight to
each of the honey sequences according to the amount of side
information contained. We then consider only the sequences
with the highest weight and output the most common SNVs
among them as our candidate SNVs for the target sequence.
In the case of no side information, we consider the most
common SNVs across all honey sequences.
(2) G2. Interval and Side information-weighted SNVs: Similar
to the previous method, however, we also adjust the weight
of each sequence when considering the most common SNVs
by the size of the interval that the seed of the respective
sequence will fall into. In the case of no side information,
we take the most common SNVs from all honey sequences,
weighted by the previously mentioned interval size.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the datasets used for the experimental
evaluation and the results obtained for both evaluation methods,
i.e., low-entropy and high-entropy passwords.
5.1 Dataset
We use the Phase III data from the HapMap dataset, i.e., the third
release from the HapMap project.2 HapMap was an international
project [11], run between 2002 and 2009, aimed at developing a
haplotype map of the human genome, and describe the common
2https://www.sanger.ac.uk/resources/downloads/human/hapmap3.html
(a) #Candidate sequences vs % revealed sparse SNVs from target sequence (b) Adv’s advantage vs % revealed sparse SNVs from target sequence
Figure 8: Results of our evaluation in the low-entropy setting vis-à-vis an adversary with access to side information in the
form of sparse SNVs from the target sequence.
patterns of human genetic variation. The HapMap data has been
made publicly available and used for various research purposes, e.g.,
to research genetic variants affecting health, disease and responses
to drugs and environmental factors, etc.
The Phase III release increased the number of DNA samples to
1,301 and included 11 different populations. In our experiments, we
select data from three populations:
(1) ASW (African ancestry in Southwest USA),
(2) CEU (Utah residents with Northern and Western European
ancestry from the CEPH collection),
(3) CHB (Han Chinese in Beijing, China).
We sample 50 sequences at random from each of them, for a total
of 150 sequences.
For all three populations presented above, we test the same SNVs
positions.
5.2 Low-Entropy Password
5.2.1 Experiment Overview. We use the following strategy for our
evaluation:
(1) Encrypt a sequence using GenoGuard’s DTE-then-encrypt
method: for each of the 150 sequences, we select and encrypt
1,000 positions from chromosome 13, with a storage over-
head h = 4 (the same as in the experimental evaluation of
GenoGuard), using a low-entropy password.
(2) Decrypt the ciphertext, using the top 10,000 most common
passwords released by Daniel Miessler3 (with the encryp-
tion password in the set), to obtain plausible looking honey
sequences;
(3) Exclude the sequences which do not contain the side infor-
mation.
(4) Output the number of remaining sequences, given howmany
of the possible passwords match the side information.
5.2.2 Adversary’s Advantage. The performance of the adversary is
calculated as the probability of the adversary guessing the target
sequence within the remaining pool of honey sequences.
3https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Passwords/
Common-Credentials/10k-most-common.txt
5.2.3 Sparse SNVs from the Target Sequence. Figure 8a illustrates
how the log number of candidate sequences decreases with more
side information available. With 1% side information (10 SNVs), the
number of sequences that match the side information reduces to
approximately 44 on average across the three populations. Figure 8b
shows the increase of the adversary’s advantage, averaged over
1000 rounds, vis-à-vis the number of SNVs available to her. 2.5%
side information (25 SNVs) gives the adversary an advantage of ap-
proximately 80% on average for the ASW and CEU populations and
close to 90% for the CHB population. With more side information,
the adversary’s advantage increases to over 90% for all populations.
5.2.4 Consecutive SNVs form the Target Sequence. When the ad-
versary has access to side information as a cluster of consecutive
SNVs, she needs more side information to achieve comparable re-
sults to the Sparse SNVs case. Figure 9a shows the decrease of the
log number of candidate sequences with increasing side informa-
tion available. We observe the fastest decrease in the number of
sequences with increasing side information available is for the ASW
population when less than 10% of the sequence available. Figure 9b
shows the increase of the adversary’s advantage, averaged over
1000 rounds, vis-à-vis the number of SNVs available to her. The
increase in the adversary’s advantage is slower as well, with an
average of 70% across the three populations for 20% of the sequence
available to the attacker.
5.3 High-Entropy Password
5.3.1 Experiment Overview. The brute-force experiment presented
in GenoGuard indicates that, when decrypting the same ciphertext
with multiple passwords, the correct sequence would be “buried”
among the incorrect ones. Hence, there is some similarity between
the original sequence and the honey sequences.
As a result, we set to quantify the corresponding privacy loss,
i.e. howmuchmore information does an adversary obtain via
access to ciphertext encrypted using GenoGuard obtains, com-
pared to one that was not.
Overall, we use the following evaluation strategy:
(a) #Candidate sequences vs % revealed consecutive SNVs from target sequence (b) Adv’s advantage vs % revealed consecutive SNVs from target sequence
Figure 9: Results of our evaluation in the low-entropy setting vis-à-vis an adversary with access to side information in the
form of a cluster of consecutive SNVs from the target sequence.
(a) ASW (b) CEU (c) CHB
Figure 10: Inference accuracy results in the high-entropy password setting for all three populations for side information
available to the attacker in the form of sparse SNVs from the target sequence.
(1) Encrypt a sequence using GenoGuard’s DTE-then-encrypt
method: for each of the 150 sequences, we select and en-
crypt 1,000 positions from chromosome 13, with a storage
overhead h = 4, using a random, high-entropy password
(approx. 72 bits).
(2) Decrypt the ciphertext, using the top 10,000 most common
passwords released by Daniel Miessler, to obtain plausible
looking honey sequences;
(3) Infer the victim’s sequence using the honey sequences.
5.3.2 Accuracy. To measure the performance and assess the poten-
tial leakage that access to the GenoGuard ciphertext might yield,
we measure the accuracy as the number of correctly guessed SNVs
over the total number or SNVs guessed.
5.3.3 Sparse SNVs from the Target Sequence. Figure 10 shows the
inference results in this case for the three population groups, aver-
aged over 1,000 rounds. In the case where no side information is
available to the attacker, for all populations, the attacker can infer
approximately 2% more of the target sequence from the GenoGuard
ciphertext than just by using baseline inferences based on the popu-
lation. For the ASW population (Figure 10a), over 80% of the target
SNVs are guessed correctly with 2.5% (25 SNVs) or more of the
target sequence available to the attacker. For the CEU population
(Figure 10b), approximately 79% of the target SNVs are guessed cor-
rectly with 2.5% of the original sequence available to the attacker
and over 83% of the target SNVs are guessed correctly with 5% (50
SNVs) or more are available. In the case of the CHB population
(Figure 10c), the accuracy is of the GenoGuard inference is the
lowest among the three populations, with over 73% accuracy in the
cases where 2.5% SNVs are available to the attacker. The accuracy
surpasses 80% for the CHB population when 10% or more of the
target SNVs are available to the attacker.
In Figure 11, we illustrate the difference between the best per-
forming inference method using the GenoGuard ciphertext and the
best performing baseline inference method. On average, having
access to the GenoGuard ciphertext improves the inference accu-
racy. The peak of the improvement in accuracy (approximately 15%)
over the baseline models can be observed when the attacker has
access to 5% sparse SNVs from the target sequence. After this, we
can see a decline in this difference with increasing SNVs available
for the attacker, as the baseline inference becomes more accurate
with more information available. In fact, for the CHB population,
the best performing baseline (B3) for the case when 20% of the
Figure 11: Difference in accuracy between the best perform-
ing GenoGuard and baseline inference methods, vis-à-vis
an adversarywith side information of sparse SNVs from the
target sequence, in the high-entropy password setting.
Figure 13: Difference in accuracy between the best perform-
ing GenoGuard and baseline inference methods, vis-à-vis
an adversary with side information in the form of consec-
utive SNVs from the target sequence, in the high-entropy
password setting.
(a) ASW (b) CEU (c) CHB
Figure 12: Inference accuracy results in the high-entropy password setting for all three populations for side information
available to the attacker in the form of a cluster of consecutive SNVs from the target sequence.
target sequence is available to the attacker provides an accuracy
comparable to the GenoGuard inferences (≈83.8%).
5.3.4 Consecutive SNVs form the Target Sequence. In Figure 12, we
illustrate the accuracy of the inference methods across the three
populations when the adversary obtains, as side information, a
cluster of consecutive SNVs, averaged over 1,000 rounds. For the
ASW population (Figure 12a), the accuracy of inferred SNVs from
the correct sequence using the GenoGuard ciphertext is over 73%
for 2.5% or more of the target SNVs available as side information,
and over 80% when 10% or more of the sequence is available to
the attacker. The GenoGuard inference for the CEU population
(Figure 12b) is over 70% when 2.5% or more of the target sequence
is available to the attacker. For the CHB population (Figure 12c), the
GenoGuard inferences have the lowest accuracy across the three
populations, obtaining 70% or more accuracy only when 5% or more
of the target sequence is available to the attacker.
Figure 13 shows the difference between the best performing
GenoGuard inference method and the best performing baseline
inference method. On average, the inference using the GenoGuard
ciphertext gives better accuracy than the baseline methods, but
overall less than the previous case where sparse SNVs are available
as side information. In this case, the peak in the improvement of
accuracy compared to the baseline methods is approximately 7%,
on average, across the three populations, when 5% of the target
SNVs are available to the attacker. For the CHB population, when
20% of the sequence is available as side information to the attacker,
we observe, as in the case of sparse SNVs, that the best performing
baseline inference method (B3) obtains a comparable accuracy to
that of the GenoGuard inferences (≈73%).
5.4 Take-Aways
Overall, our experimental evaluation shows that, when the adver-
sary has access to some side information, access to a ciphertext
encrypted using GenoGuard can help her recover a remarkably high
percentage of the SNVs from the target sequence or significantly
increase her advantage in recovering the correct sequence.
Therefore, users need to include as much side information as
possible when encrypting their genomic sequence. However, this
prompts a parallel problem, with respect to how much that user
is willing to publicly share (as this information is saved together
with the ciphertext), considering that even without access to the
GenoGuard ciphertext, it can enable attackers to correctly predict
most of the target genome.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review relevant prior work on genome privacy
and honey encryption.
6.1 Genome Privacy
Re-identification. Genomic data is hard to anonymize, due to the
genome’s uniqueness as well as correlations within different re-
gions. For instance, Gymrek et al. [15] demonstrate that surnames
of genomic data donors can be inferred using data publicly avail-
able from recreational genealogy databases. They also discuss how,
through deep genealogical ties, publishing even a few markers
can lead to the identification of another person who might have
no acquaintance with the one who released their genetic data. In
follow-up work, Erlich et al. [12] show that a genetic database
which covers only 2% of the target population can be used to find a
third-cousin of nearly any individual.
Membership inference. Homer et al. [16] present a membership
inference attack in which they infer the presence of an individual’s
genotype within a complex genomic DNA mixture. Wang et al. [41]
improve on the attack using correlation statistics of just a few
hundreds SNPs, while Im et al. [18] rely on regression coefficients.
Shringarpure and Bustamante [36] perform membership inference
against the Beacon network.4 They use a likelihood-ratio test to
predict whether an individual is present in the Beacon, detecting
membership within a Beacon with 1,000 individuals using 5,000
queries. Also, Von Thenen et al. [39] reduce the number of queries
to less than 0.5%. Their best performing attack uses a high-order
Markov chain to model the SNP correlations, as described in [35].
Note that, as part of the attacks described in this paper, we use
inference methods from [35] as our baseline inference methods.
Data sharing. Progress in genomics research is dependent on col-
laboration and data sharing among different institutions. Given
the sensitive nature of the data, as well as regulatory and ethics
constraints, this often proves to be a challenging task. Kamm et
al. [22] propose the use of secret sharing to distribute data among
several entities and, using secure multi-party computations, sup-
port privacy-friendly computations across multiple entities. Wang
et al. [42] present GENSETS, a genome-wide, privacy-preserving
similar patients querying system using genomic edit distance ap-
proximation and private set difference protocols. Then, Chen et
al. [8] use Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to build a privacy-
preserving international collaboration tool; this enables secure and
distributed computations over encrypted data, thus supporting the
4Beacons are web servers that answer questions e.g. “does your dataset
include a genome that has a specific nucleotide at a specific genomic co-
ordinate?” to which the Beacon responds yes or no, without referring to a
specific individual; see: https://github.com/ga4gh-beacon/specification.
analysis of rare disease genetic data across different continents. Fi-
nally, Oprisanu and De Cristofaro [31] present a framework (“Anon-
iMME”) geared supporting anonymous queries within the Match-
maker Exchange platform, which allows researchers to perform
queries for rare genetic disease discovery over multiple federated
databases.
Privacy-friendly testing. Another line of work focuses on pro-
tecting privacy in the context of personal genomic testing, i.e., com-
putational tests run on sequenced genomes to assess, e.g., genetic
susceptibility to diseases, determining the best course of treatment,
etc. Baldi et al. [5] assume that each individual keeps a copy of
their data and consents to tests done in such a way that only the
outcome is disclosed. They present a few cryptographic protocols
allowing researchers to privately search mutations in specific genes.
Ayday et al. [3] rely on a semi-trusted party to store an encrypted
copy of the individual’s genomic data: using additively homomor-
phic encryption and proxy re-encryption, they allow a Medical
Center to privately perform disease susceptibility tests on patients’
SNPs. Naveed et al. [28] introduce a new cryptographic primitive
called Controlled Functional Encryption (CFE), which allows users
to learn only certain functions of the (encrypted) data, using keys
obtained from an authority; however, the client is required to send a
fresh key request to the authority every time they want to evaluate
a function on a ciphertext. Overall, for an overview of privacy-
enhancing technologies applied to genetic testing, we refer the
reader to [26].
Long-term security. As the sensitivity of genomic data does not
degrade over time, access to an individual’s genome poses a threat
to her descendants, even years after she has deceased. To the best of
our knowledge, GenoGuard [17] is the only attempt to provide long-
term security. GenoGuard, reviewed in Section 3, relies on Honey
Encryption [20], aiming to provide confidentiality in the presence
of brute-force attacks; it only serves as a storage mechanism, i.e.,
it does not support selective retrieval or testing on encrypted data
(as such, it is not “composable” with other techniques supporting
privacy-preserving testing or data sharing). In this paper, we pro-
vide a security analysis of GenoGuard. In parallel to our work,
Cheng et al. [9] recently propose attacks against probability model
transforming encoders, and also evaluate them on GenoGuard. Us-
ing machine learning, they train a classifier to distinguish between
the real and the decoy sequences, and exclude all decoy data for
approximately 48% of the individuals in the tested dataset.
6.2 Honey Encryption
Juels and Ristenpart [20] introduce Honey Encryption (HE) as a
general approach to encrypt messages using low min-entropy keys
such as passwords. HE, reviewed in Section 2.4, is designed to
yield plausible-looking ciphertexts, called honey messages, even
when decrypted with a wrong password. In a nutshell, it uses a
distribution-transforming-encoder (DTE) to encode a-priori knowl-
edge of themessage distribution, aiming to providemessage recovery
security against computationally unbounded adversaries. It was
originally designed to encrypt credit card information, RSA secret
keys, etc. [38].
Message recovery security can be defined as follows [19]: given
a message encrypted under a key whose maximum probability of
taking on any particular value is at most 1/2µ , an unbounded adver-
sary’s ability to guess the correct message, even given the ciphertext,
is at most 1/2µ plus a negligible amount. However, Jaeger et al. [19]
discuss deficiencies of message recovery security as per modern
security goals. More specifically, not only they prove the impossi-
bility of known-message attack security in the case of low-entropy
keys, but also mention that schemes meeting message recovery
security might actually leak a significant amount of information
about the plaintexts, even if the adversary cannot correctly recover
the full message with non-negligible probability. Although this
serves as an inspiration to our work, note that the context of our
evaluation is different, as in the low-entropy setting, we show that a
lower bound also applies to the adversary’s advantage when partial
information from the target sequence is available to the attacker,
compared to having pairs of ciphertext and plaintext. Another work
studying attacks against HE is that by Cheng et al. [9], which we
have reviewed above.
Honeywords. Before Honey Encryption [20], Juels and Rivest [21]
introduced the concept of “honeywords” to improve the security of
password databases. They propose adding honeywords (false pass-
words) to a password database together with the actual password
(hashed with salt) of each user. This way, an adversary who hacks
into the password database and inverts the hash function cannot
know whether she has found the password or a honeyword.
Wang et al. [40] present an evaluation of the honeyword sys-
tem [21], finding it to be vulnerable to a number of attacks. More
specifically, an adversary that wants to distinguish between real
and decoy passwords can do so with a success rate of 30% compared
to an expected 5%. In the case of a targeted attack, when the adver-
sary is assumed to know some personal information about the user,
they show that the adversary’s success rate is further improved
to about 60%. Our attacks differ from those in [40], first, as they
target the honeywords system [21], while we focus on Honey En-
cryption [20], and in particular its application to GenoGuard [17].
Moreover, their attack only aims to identify the correct password
from a given password pool, while we also examine the case when
the correct password is not found within the tried passwords.
7 CONCLUSION
Motivated by the decreasing cost of genomic sequencing and the
related arising privacy challenges, the research community has pro-
duced a large body of work on genomic privacy. Most of the tech-
niques focus on cryptographic tools, but fail to address the need for
long term confidentiality for genomic data. In fact, GenoGuard [17]
is the only tool available for ensuring the long term encryption
needed for genomic data [26].
In this paper, we set to determine whether GenoGuard can be
safely used as an encryption tool, quantifying the additional privacy
leakage arising from using it. We analyzed GenoGuard under two
scenarios, based on the encryption password, for an adversary
which has access to side information about the target sequence in
the form of some values of SNVs from the target sequence. First,
we assumed that the user encrypts his genomic sequence using a
low-entropy, easily guessable password. In this case, we found that
the adversary can easily exclude decoy passwords from the pool of
possible passwords, and can guess the correct sequence with high
probability by having access to 2.5% sparse SNVs or 20% or more
consecutive SNVs from the target sequence.
Second, we assumed that the user encrypts his sequence using a
high-entropy password. In this case, since elimination of decoy pass-
words might not yield any sequence, we use the honey sequences
to obtain as much information as possible from the target sequence,
exploiting the similarity between the original sequence and the
honey sequences [17]. We then compared the sequence obtained
from the honey sequences to state-of-the-art methods from genome
sequence inference in order to observe the privacy leakage. Even
with no side information available to the attacker, the sequence
obtained from the honey sequences had a 2% improvement on aver-
age over all tested baseline methods. With side information in the
form of sparse SNVs from the target sequence, the improvement in
accuracy compared to the baseline inference models raises to up
to 15% on average when 5% of the target sequence is available to
the attacker, predicting more than 82% (on average) of the target
sequence correctly. When the attacker obtains consecutive SNVs
from the target sequence, the accuracy of the attacker decreases
slightly from the previous case, yielding 73% accuracy when 5% of
the target sequence is known, with an average improvement of 7%
over the baseline methods.
In conclusion, we argue that the research community should
invest more resources toward the design of long-term encryption
tools for genomic data. Overall, GenoGuard could be a viable so-
lution when the user incorporates all side information into the
encryption. However, given the fact that all this information needs
to be stored together with the ciphertext, it also prompts the ques-
tion of how much is a user willing to disclose, considering that only
the baseline methods can predict, with high accuracy, the correct
sequence (e.g. with 20% sparse SNVs available to the attacker, her
accuracy is, on average, over 82%). Users who have already used
GenoGuard for long-term encryption purposes need to be aware
that if further genomic information can be obtained by the attacker,
it will severely diminish the security of the system.
As part of future work, we plan to analyze the security of
GenoGuard for side information arising from kinship associations.
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